NOT.

EVEN THOUGH experts continue to raise questions about the vulnerability of touch-screen voting systems to fraud and computer glitches, Maryland election officials seem determined to press a flawed plan to adopt them. The state is buying into a system that has come under increasing scrutiny since July, when researchers from the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University cited numerous vulnerabilities in touch-screen technology. They determined that, among other shortcomings, the computer code in the voting machines made by Diebold Elections Systems was anything but hacker-proof; that an outsider could tamper with the program, and the tampering would be difficult to detect.

That was the first red flag, enough to prompt Gov. Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. (R) to order a review by Science Applications International Corp., which also concluded that the system was "at high risk of compromise." Then, last month, computer scientist Aviel D. Rubin of the Johns Hopkins team reiterated his criticism, telling the state House Ways and Means Committee that a computer programmer could switch 10 percent of the votes from one candidate to another and leave no traces.

As if this weren't enough to generate uneasiness, Diebold's chief executive, an active Republican fundraiser, has been quoted as saying he is committed to "helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes" to President Bush next year. Then there's the report of an e-mail found in files apparently stolen from the firm that recommended charging Maryland "out the yin-yang" if the state were to ask that machines be equipped to produce paper printouts that can be verified by the voters.

Maryland ought to be able to negotiate a fair price for the cost of adding printers, and paper records ought to be a requirement, regardless of which company does the job. In California, the secretary of state has announced that all electronic voting machines must include paper printouts by 2006. Maryland Del. Karen S. Montgomery (D-Montgomery) has drafted legislation that would require voter-verified paper records. Voters would be allowed to correct errors they find on the printouts of their votes. The bill also would require random checks of the paper records in 2 percent of election precincts against the computer records, to search for possible tampering.

Before committing itself to a suspect system, Maryland at the least should insist on the kinds of protection sought by Ms. Montgomery. Mr. Ehrlich should join in putting these safeguards on the books and in conducting a further review of the arrangement with Diebold.